Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological "readiness potentials" (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about -550 ms. Such RPs were used to indicate the minimum onset times for the cerebral activity that precedes a fully endogenous voluntary act. The time of conscious intention to act was obtained from the subject's recall of the spatial clock position of a revolving spot at the time of his initial awareness of intending or wanting to move (W). W occurred at about -200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.
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One of the mysteries in the mind-brain relationship is expressed in the question: How does a voluntary act arise in relation to the cerebral processes that mediate it? The discovery of the "readiness potential" (RP) opened up possibilities for experimentally addressing a crucial feature of this question. The RP is a scalp-recorded slow negative shift in electrical potential generated by the brain and beginning up to a second or more before a self-paced, apparently voluntary motor act (Deecke, Grozinger & Kornhuber 1976; Gilden, Vaughan & Costa 1966; Kornhuber & Deecke 1965) . The long time interval (averaging about 800 ms) by which RP onset preceded a self-paced act raises the crucial question whether the conscious awareness of the voluntary urge to act likewise appears so far in advance. If a conscious intention or decision to act actually initiates a voluntary event, then the subjective experience of this intention should precede or at least coincide with the onset of the specific cerebral processes that mediate the act.
This issue has recently been subjected to experimental tests and analyses, which I shall review briefly (Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl 1983; Libet, Wright & Gleason 1982; 1983) . The experimental findings led us to the conclusion that voluntary acts can be initiated by unconscious cerebral processes before conscious intention appears but that conscious control over the actual motor II:) 1985 Cambridge University Press 0140-525XI851040529-381$06.00 performance of the acts remains possible. I shall discuss these conclusions and their implications for concepts of "the unconscious" and of conscious voluntary action. I propose the thesis that conscious volitional control may operate not to initiate the volitional process but to select and control it, either by permitting or triggering the final motor outcome of the unconsciously initiated process or by vetoing the progression to actual motor activation.
(The reader is referred to our original cited research papers for the full details of the experimental techniques and observations together with their evaluation, etc.)
Definitions of voluntary action and will
Since the meanings assigned to the terms "voluntary action" and "will" can be quite complicated and are often related to one's philosophical biases, I shall attempt to clarify their usage here. In this experimental investigation and its analysis an act is regarded as voluntary and a function of the subject's will when (a) it arises endogenously, not in direct response to an external stimulus or cue; (b) there are no externally imposed restrictions or compulsions that directly or immediately control subjects' initiation and performance of the act; and (c) most important, subjects feel introspectively that they are 529 Libet: Cerebral processes and volition performing the act on their own initiative and that they are free to start or not to start the act as they wish. The significance of point (c) is sharply illustrated in the case of stimulating the motor cortex (precentral gyrus) in awake human subjects. As described by Penfield (1958) and noted by others, under these conditions each subject regarded the motor action resulting from cortical stimulation as something done to him by some external force; every subject felt that, in contrast to his normal voluntary activities, "he," as a self-conscious entity, had not initiated or controlled the cortically stimulated act. The technical requirements of experiments do impose limits on the kinds of voluntary choices and settings available to the subject. The nature of the acts must be prescribed by the experimenter. In the studies to be discussed here the acts were to consist uniformly of a quick flexion of the fingers or wrist of the right hand; this yielded a sharply rising electromyogram (EMG) in the appropriate muscle to serve as a trigger for O-reference time. The subjects were free, however, to choose to perform this act at any time the desire, urge, decision, and will should arise in them. (They were also free not to act out any given urge or initial decision to act; and each subject indeed reported frequent instances of such aborted intentions.) The freedom of the subject to act at the time of his choosing actually provides the crucial element in this study. The objective was in fact to compare the time of onset of the conscious intention to act and the time of onset of associated cerebral processes. The specific choice of what act to perform was not material to the question being asked.
Volitional processes may operate at various levels of organization and timing relative to the voluntary act. These may include consciously deliberating alternative choices as to what to do and when, whether or not to act, whether or not to comply with external orders or instructions to act, and so on. If any of these processes are to result in the motor performance of a voluntary act, they must somehow work their way into a "final common motor activation pathway" in the brain. Without an overt motor performance any volitional deliberation, choosing, or planning may be interesting for its mental or psychological content, but it does not constitute voluntary action. It is specifically this overt performance of the act that was experimentally studied by us.
In the present experimental paradigm subjects agree to comply with a variety of instructions from the experimenter. One of these is an expectation that the subject is to perform the prescribed motor act at some time after the start of each trial; another is that he should pay close introspective attention to the instant of the onset of the urge, desire, or decision to perform each such act and to the correlated spatial position of a revolving spot on a clock face (indicating "clock time"). The subject is also instructed to allow each such act to arise "spontaneously," without deliberately planning or paying attention to the "prospect" of acting in advance. The subjects did indeed report that the inclination for each act appeared spontaneously ("out of nowhere"), that they were consciously aware of their urge or decision to act before each act, that they felt in conscious control of whether or not to act, and that they felt no external or psychological pressures that affected the time when they decided to act (Libet et al. 1982; Libet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl 1983) .
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THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1985) 8:4 Thus, in spite of the experimental requirements, the basic conditions set out above for a voluntary act were met. Conditions for the subject's decision as to when to act were designated to represent those one could associate with a conscious, endogenously willed motor action, so that one could study the cerebral processes involved in such an act without confusing them with deliberative or preparatory features that do not necessarily result in action.
Finally, one should note that the voluntary action studied was defined operationally, including appropriate and reliable reports of introspective experiences. The definition is not committed to or dependent upon any specific philosophical view of the mind-brain relationship. However, some implications that are relevant to mind-brain theories will be drawn from the findings.
Cerebral processes precede conscious Intention
Two experimental issues have to be resolved in order to obtain a relevant answer to the questions about the relative timing of conscious intentions and cerebral processes in the performance of voluntary acts: (1) Is the RP a valid indicator of cerebral processes that mediate voluntary acts? (2) How can one meaningfully measure the onset of the conscious intention, urge, or will -to perform a specific voluntary motor act?
RPs In voluntary acts
Self-paced acts were used in the discovery ofRPs (Gilden et al. 1966; Kornhuber & Deecke 1965) and in subsequent RP studies (e.g., Deecke et al. 1976; Shibasaki, Barrett, Halliday & Halliday 1980; Vaughan, Costa & Ritter 1968 ). Such acts have features that may compromise the exercise offree volition or confuse its interpretation: (a) Recording an RP requires averaging many events. When these self-paced acts are repeated in a continuous series, with irregular intervening intervals of 3-6 sec as selected by the subject, they become boring and may come to be performed in a stereotyped and almost automatic way, with no assurance that conscious control could be exercised in each trial. (b) Since subjects were asked to act within an allotted time interval, they may be under pressure consciously or unconsciously to plan to act within the time limit; that is, the subject's voluntary choice of when to act may be compromised by an external requirement. (c) Subjects are required not to blink until just after each act. The need to blink may impel the subject to act, thus serving as an external controlling factor. In a study of what we termed" self-initiated" acts, these external forces were minimized or eliminated (Libet et al. 1982) . Each trial in an averaging series of 40 trials was initiated as a separate independent event after a flexible delay determined by each subject's own readiness to proceed; there was no limit on the time in which subjects were to act; they were given the option to blink if necessary. For each trial, subjects were asked to perform a simple quick flexion of the wrist or fingers at any time they felt the "urge" or desire to do so; timing was to be entirely "ad lib," that is, spontaneous and fully endoge-
